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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, 
 
Circuit Judge 
 This case involves two lawsuits concerning the 
investigation and subsequent termination of plaintiff-
appellant William Morgan, a former police officer with 
Covington Township, Pennsylvania.1
                                              
1 Covington Township is a defendant-appellee in this case, 
along with Morgan’s police department supervisor, Sergeant 
Bernard Klocko, and the Chairman of the Board of 
  We reverse the District 
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Court’s decision to dismiss Morgan’s second case on res 
judicata grounds and affirm in all other respects.   
I. Background 
In 2007, when the events underlying this case took 
place, Morgan was employed by Covington Township as a 
police officer.  In July and August of that year, he was 
involved in two incidents that eventually resulted in 
disciplinary charges.   
First, Morgan was accused of attempting to interfere in 
another officer’s investigation of a “verbal altercation” 
between Morgan’s ex-girlfriend, Jill Mailen, and a security 
guard, Carla Sodano.  (This stemmed from Mailen’s mistaken 
belief that Sodano was in a relationship with Morgan.)  
Following the altercation, Sodano made a complaint against 
Mailen, and Sergeant Klocko ordered the investigating officer 
to issue Mailen a citation.  Sometime thereafter, Morgan—
who had no official role in the investigation—reportedly 
approached Sodano’s supervisor to ask whether she could be 
convinced to withdraw her complaint against Mailen.  
Additionally, Klocko asserted that Morgan then told him and 
the investigating officer that he (Morgan) was taking care of 
the situation and that the charges would be dropped.  Morgan 
denies this assertion. 
Second, Morgan entered the empty apartment of Jamie 
Villani, his most recent ex-girlfriend, possibly without 
                                                                                                     
Supervisors of Covington Township, Thomas Yerke.  We 
refer to the defendants collectively as “Covington.”   
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permission.  When Morgan left the apartment, he neglected to 
shut the back door.  To state the obvious, Villani was 
surprised and upset when she arrived home.  She reported this 
incident to Klocko.     
 On August 16, 2007, Klocko notified the Covington 
Township Board of Supervisors of these events, and asserted 
that they were part of a larger pattern of “inefficient 
performance of duties.”  In particular, Klocko characterized 
Morgan’s intervention in the Mailen/Sodano situation as 
criminal conduct amounting to “official oppression, 
intimidation of witnesses or victims, and/or retaliation against 
witnesses, victim, or party.”  Klocko recommended that 
Morgan be suspended without pay.  The next day, Covington 
Township filed disciplinary charges against Morgan and 
informed him that he had a right to respond to the charges in 
writing, to request a public hearing, and to be represented by 
counsel.  Morgan, through counsel, invoked his right to a 
public hearing.   
The disciplinary charges against Morgan were 
suspended shortly thereafter, when Klocko notified the 
Pennsylvania State Police of Morgan’s possible commission 
of “official oppression,” and placed Morgan on administrative 
leave with pay.  The Pennsylvania State Police ultimately 
declined to investigate.  Klocko then referred the case to the 
Lackawanna County District Attorney, who also declined to 
pursue the matter.  Once those avenues were exhausted, 
Covington Township reinstituted the disciplinary charges 
against Morgan and added an additional charge of conduct 
unbecoming an officer.  Morgan, who again requested a 
public hearing, was continued on paid administrative leave.  
Morgan’s hearing was scheduled for November 5, 2007. 
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Before that hearing, Morgan filed a complaint in 
federal District Court (“Morgan I”).  He alleged that all three 
Covington defendants had: 1) violated his procedural due 
process rights by publicizing the charges against him and 
failing to afford him a hearing before suspending him with 
pay; and 2) violated the First Amendment by retaliating 
against him for his decision to request a public hearing by 
referring for possible prosecution his intervention in the 
Mailen/Sodano situation.  He also alleged that Covington 
Township had failed to train its employees, resulting in a 
constitutional injury to Morgan.   
On March 6, 2009, following discovery, the District 
Court granted summary judgment to Covington on Morgan’s 
due process claims.  It concluded that Morgan was not 
entitled to a hearing before his suspension with pay because 
“[h]is private interest in having the opportunity to tell his side 
of the story before being placed on suspension is outweighed 
by the governmental interest in prompt action to protect the 
integrity of the police force.”  Morgan v. Covington Twp., No. 
3:07-cv-1972, 2009 WL 585480, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 
2009).  It also rejected Morgan’s reputational harm claim 
based on its conclusion that he failed to identify any instance 
in which any defendant publicly accused him of a crime.  Id. 
at *9.  However, the Court denied summary judgment as to 
Morgan’s First Amendment retaliation claim.   
In the meantime, Covington went ahead with 
Morgan’s administrative hearing and, following its 
completion on January 15, 2008, the Board voted to terminate 
Morgan’s employment.  However, Morgan did not 
immediately seek to amend his complaint based on his 
termination.  Rather, he did so on April 9, 2009, just two 
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weeks before his First Amendment claim was to go to trial.  
The District Court denied the motion to amend, ruling that it 
had come too late.   
Later that day, Morgan filed a new complaint under a 
new case number (“Morgan II”) alleging that the same three 
Covington defendants illegally retaliated against him by 
terminating his employment because he demanded a hearing 
and filed Morgan I.  The new complaint also included the 
following footnote: 
After being notified by the Court 
this morning that the Court 
determined that Morgan’s 
termination would not be included 
in as a claim in [Morgan I], 
Morgan files the instant complaint 
. . . . Morgan requests that this 
Complaint be consolidated with 
[Morgan I], and that all claims be 
heard before the same jury for the 
sake of judicial economy, 
consistency, and complete 
resolution of all claims against 
Defendants. 
On April 20, 2009, trial began in Morgan I, which was 
not consolidated with Morgan II.  During the trial, and of 
relevance to this appeal, Morgan was denied permission to 
call three rebuttal witnesses who, he asserted, would 
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undermine Klocko’s and Yerke’s credibility by rebutting their 
earlier testimony.2
[y]ou ask a question and you get an 
answer.  That’s the end of it if it’s a 
collateral matter, and these are 
collateral matters.  Whether or not 
somebody used public property, for 
example, he said no.  And if you 
had evidence that he did, the time to 
have impeached him with it was 
then, not bring in another witness 
now and say, well, yeah, I know he 
used . . . public property, because 
then what we’ve done is we’ve 
joined issue on the question of did 
he or didn’t he use . . . public 
property . . . .  And then he’d be 
entitled to try the issue of whether 
or not he did.  It’s collateral.  I’m 
not allowing it. 
  The District Court reasoned that 
After trial was completed, Covington successfully 
sought a jury instruction that it should prevail if it would have 
referred Morgan’s conduct to the State Police and the District 
Attorney even if he had not asked for a hearing.  Morgan 
                                              
2 Morgan sought to call Scott Van Fleet to rebut Yerke’s 
testimony that he (Yerke) never used Township property for 
personal use, Barbara Findeis to testify that Klocko had either 
done or requested “favors” in the past, and Brian Yeager to 
rebut testimony of Klocko that he had never charged anyone 
with the crime of official oppression. 
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objected that Covington had never pled this theory, which he 
characterized as an affirmative defense, and that it was 
therefore inappropriate to instruct the jury on it.  However, 
the District Court agreed with Covington’s counsel that 
whether it would have taken the same actions against Morgan 
(regardless of his First Amendment-protected activity) was 
not an affirmative defense, but rather “one of the elements . . . 
of the claim.”   
The jury found for all three Covington defendants.  It 
first concluded that Morgan proved that the Township—
though not Klocko or Yerke—retaliated against him for 
exercising his First Amendment right to petition.  However, 
the jury also found that the Township established that it 
would have taken the same actions against Morgan even if he 
had not requested a hearing.   
 Several months later, in November 2009, the District 
Court dismissed Morgan II, concluding that it was barred by 
res judicata because it “arose out of the same transaction” 
and the “same operative facts at issue” as in Morgan I.  
Morgan v. Covington Township, 3:09-cv-00651, 2009 WL 
3818431 at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2009).  Additionally, the 
Court reasoned that but for Morgan’s decision to wait until 
just before trial to seek to amend his complaint to encompass 
his termination, that claim would have been heard in Morgan 
I.  Id. at *5. 
Morgan timely appealed the decisions in both cases.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over both Morgan I 
and Morgan II under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo the District 
Court’s decisions granting partial summary judgment to 
Covington in Morgan I and dismissing Morgan II on res 
judicata grounds.  Massie v. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 
620 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010); Peduto v. City of North 
Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 727 (3d Cir. 1989).  We review for 
abuse of discretion both the District Court’s refusal to allow 
Morgan to present “rebuttal” witnesses and its decision to 
instruct the jury on the “same action” defense to Morgan’s 
First Amendment claim.  McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 
447, 462 (3d Cir. 2009); Donlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. 
Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 78 & 80 (3d Cir. 2009). 
III. Analysis 
 On appeal, Morgan contends that:  (1) the District 
Court erred by dismissing Morgan II because the event 
underlying that complaint—Morgan’s termination from his 
job as a police officer—took place after Morgan I was filed; 
(2) Covington was not entitled to a jury instruction on the 
“same action” defense because it failed to plead that 
“affirmative defense” in its answer; (3) he should have been 
permitted to call Yerke’s and Klocko’s credibility into doubt 
through rebuttal witnesses; and (4) Covington was not 
entitled to summary judgment as to his due process claims.  
We discuss these arguments in turn. 
A. The Application of Res Judicata to Morgan II 
  Res judicata promotes judicial economy and protects 
defendants from having to defend multiple identical or nearly 
identical lawsuits by “bar[ring] not only claims that were 
brought in a previous action, but also claims that could have 
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been brought.”  In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 
2008).  It applies when there exists “(1) a final judgment on 
the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or 
their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same 
cause of action.”  Id. (quoting Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 
F.3d 154, 169 (3d Cir. 2007)).  However, our Court has not 
yet decided whether res judicata may apply to events, like 
Morgan’s termination in this case, that postdate—but relate 
to—an earlier-filed lawsuit. 
 Morgan argues that the cut-off date for res judicata 
purposes was the date he filed Morgan I, and that he was 
therefore free to file a separate complaint based on his later 
termination.  Covington counters that there is significant 
factual overlap between Morgan I—which has already been 
decided by a jury—and Morgan II, and that significant 
resources will be wasted if we allow those issues to be re-
litigated.   
 Five other Courts of Appeals have already adopted a 
bright-line rule that res judicata does not apply to events 
post-dating the filing of the initial complaint.  Smith v. Potter, 
513 F.3d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Res judicata does not bar 
a suit based on claims that accrue after a previous suit was 
filed. . . . It does not matter whether, as in the case of 
harassment, the unlawful conduct is a practice, repetitive by 
nature . . . that happens to continue after the first suit is filed, 
or whether it is an act, causing discrete, calculable harm, that 
happens to be repeated.”); Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
462 F.3d 521, 529 (6th Cir. 2006) (“‘Simply put, [Rawe] 
could not have asserted a claim that [she] did not have at the 
time’” the complaint was filed.) (citation omitted); Mitchell v. 
City of Moore, 218 F.3d 1190, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 2000) 
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(“[W]e agree with those courts holding the doctrine of claim 
preclusion does not necessarily bar plaintiffs from litigating 
claims based on conduct that occurred after the initial 
complaint was filed.”); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, 
Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1997) (“For the purposes 
of res judicata, ‘[t]he scope of the litigation is framed by the 
complaint at the time it is filed.’”) (citation omitted); 
Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 
1992) (“[W]e do not believe that the res judicata preclusion of 
claims that ‘could have been brought’ in earlier litigation 
includes claims which arise after the original pleading is filed 
in the earlier litigation.”); see also Los Angeles Branch 
NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 739 
(9th Cir. 1984) (noting that res judicata would encompass 
acts “occurring prior to the commencement” of the prior 
litigation).   
We see no reason to part with our sister Circuit Courts.  
A contrary rule would only invite disputes about whether 
plaintiffs could have amended their initial complaints to 
assert claims based on later-occurring incidents.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(a) (describing when parties may amend pleadings 
as of right, and when they must first seek leave from the court 
or the defendant’s consent).  That would be especially unwise 
in this area of the law, in which certainty and predictability 
are important.  Further, we doubt that this rule will 
substantially increase the burdens on either courts or 
defendants.   
We hold that res judicata does not bar claims that are 
predicated on events that postdate the filing of the initial 
12 
 
complaint, and thus we conclude that the District Court 
should not have dismissed the complaint in Morgan II.3
B. Covington’s Entitlement to a Jury Instruction on 
the “Same Action” Theory 
    
 Morgan argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion by instructing the jurors that Covington should 
prevail if it showed that it “would have reached the same 
decision . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct,” 
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 
287 (1977).  Specifically, Morgan contends that what he 
terms the Mt. Healthy “same action” defense is an affirmative 
defense that Covington waived by failing to plead it in its 
answer.  For its part, Covington argues that the same action 
defense is actually “the third step in a ‘well established three-
step test to evaluate a public employee’s claim of retaliation 
for engaging in activity protected under the First 
Amendment.’”  Appellee Br. at 14 (quoting Hill v. City of 
Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005)).4
                                              
3 The concept of issue preclusion emerged at oral argument.  
In the event that the parties raise this issue on remand, the 
District Court can decide what, if any, effect the application 
of issue preclusion has in this case. 
  Covington 
adds that, in any event, Morgan has waived his argument by 
failing to object to the same action defense when Covington 
raised it at summary judgment.    
 
4 The first two steps require the employee to show that “the 
activity is in fact protected,” and “the protected activity ‘was 
a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action.’”  Hill, 
411 F.3d at 125 (citation omitted).  
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 We need not decide whether Covington was required 
to raise its same action defense in its answer (or in a motion 
to amend its answer) because we agree that Morgan failed to 
object to it at summary judgment, and thereby waived his 
objection.  In its memorandum in support of summary 
judgment, Covington raised the same action defense.  While 
its discussion was brief, it was sufficient to prompt a one-
page response from Morgan, who did not argue therein that 
the defense was waived.  Undoubtedly, neither brief’s 
discussion of the defense was robust.  However, the 
deferential standard of review applicable to this issue leads us 
to conclude that the District Court did not err in instructing 
the jury on the same action defense. 
C. Morgan’s Entitlement to Call Rebuttal Witnesses 
on Credibility Issues 
 Morgan argues that the District Court erred by refusing 
to allow him to call two witnesses—Van Fleet5 and 
Findeis6
                                              
5 Morgan’s counsel explained that she wanted to call Van 
Fleet because he could show that Yerke’s testimony that “he 
never used Covington property for personal use” was “a lie.”  
App. 652.  
—who would have testified that certain aspects of 
Yerke’s and Klocko’s testimony were untrue.  We agree with 
Morgan that the District Court should have allowed this 
testimony, but conclude that he failed to carry his burden of 
showing that the error so affected his “substantial rights,” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 61, that he is entitled to a new trial. 
 
6 Findeis was to testify that Klocko had “done favors” for 
others in the course of his duties.  Id. at 652. 
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 The District Court concluded that “collateral” issues 
were impermissible subjects of rebuttal testimony.  Picking 
up on that reasoning, Covington argues that the proffered 
testimony is covered by Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), 
which forbids parties from proving “[s]pecific instances of 
the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting the witness’ character for truthfulness,” through 
“extrinsic evidence.”   
 Covington and the District Court overlook the crucial 
fact that Morgan sought to contradict specific testimony 
offered under oath, rather than simply to suggest that Yerke 
or Klocko had engaged in dishonest behavior on some other 
occasion.  In other words, Morgan sought to engage in 
“impeachment by contradiction,” which is not covered by 
Fed. R. Evid. 608.  United States v. Castillo, 181 F.3d 1129, 
1132-33 (9th Cir. 1999) (Rule 608(b) excludes only extrinsic 
evidence that goes to a witness’s general credibility, but the 
doctrine of impeachment by contradiction “permits courts to 
admit extrinsic evidence that specific testimony is false, 
because contradicted by other evidence.”); United States v. 
Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
Rule 608 does not apply to impeachment by contradiction).  
Our Court has previously described impeachment by 
contradiction as “a means of policing the defendant’s 
obligation to speak the truth in response to proper questions,” 
something limited by Fed. R. Evid. 403, which permits courts 
to exclude evidence if its probative value is “substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”  United States v. Gilmore, 553 F.3d 
266, 271 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks 
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omitted).  Here, the District Court did not analyze whether the 
probative value of Morgan’s proffered evidence was 
“substantially outweighed by” any of the considerations in 
Fed. R. Evid. 403, as it needed to do.  Thus, it should not 
have excluded Morgan’s proposed rebuttal testimony. 
Nonetheless, as both the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence make clear, 
“[a]n error that is harmless is not grounds for disturbing a 
judgment.”  Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit 
Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 61); see also Fed. R. Evid. 103 (“Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of a party is affected.”); Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 61 (“Unless justice requires, no error in admitting or 
excluding evidence . . . is ground for granting a new trial . . . . 
At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all 
errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial 
rights.”).  Moreover, as this is a civil case, it is Morgan’s 
burden to show that the District Court’s error was harmful.  
See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1706 (2009).  Yet, 
Morgan does not argue as much in his brief, and our own 
review of the record suggests the reason why.   
Van Fleet was to testify concerning Yerke’s personal 
use of Township property, in response to the latter’s 
testimony that he had neither done so nor been ordered by a 
court to stop doing so.  Yerke’s testimony was elicited during 
cross-examination, and was preceded by an exchange that we 
believe substantially reduced the need for Van Fleet’s 
testimony.  Specifically, Morgan’s counsel raised the issue, 
and after Covington objected, the Court held a side-bar 
conversation with the two lawyers.  During that colloquy, 
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Yerke’s counsel observed that Yerke’s personal use of a 
backhoe owned by Covington was “[t]he subject of a 
litigation in Lackawanna County.”  The Court overruled the 
objection, and Morgan’s counsel asked Yerke if he had “been 
accused of using . . . Covington Township equipment for [his] 
personal use,” to which Yerke answered “[b]y who?”  
Yerke’s counsel objected, and the Court asked whether the 
question went to “an accusation or a concluded matter that’s 
been adjudicated.”  Morgan’s counsel replied that she did not 
“know the particulars of it.”  Yerke then denied having used 
the property and having been ordered to stop using the 
property.   
We believe this exchange would have alerted the jury 
that, though Yerke denied it, he had at least been accused of 
misusing Township property.  This would have permitted the 
jury to infer that there was a dispute whether Yerke had 
testified truthfully.  We do not think that Van Fleet’s 
testimony amplifying that dispute would have meaningfully 
affected Morgan’s rights. 
Morgan’s position as to Findeis is even weaker.  The 
latter was to testify that Klocko had previously “done favors.”  
This testimony was intended to rebut Klocko’s testimony 
during the following exchange: 
Q.  Sergeant Klocko, you’ve asked people in 
law enforcement for favors, correct? 
A.  Specify favors. 
Q.  If you can help somebody out? 
A.  I don’t recall a specific situation. 
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App. 179.  Then, Covington’s attorney objected and the Court 
sustained the objection; Morgan does not argue on appeal that 
the objection was improperly sustained.   
 We conclude that Klocko’s testimony was simply too 
vague and attenuated for the District Court’s exclusion of 
Findeis’s testimony to have harmed Morgan.  Morgan’s 
counsel asked very general questions about favors—not even 
improper favors—and Klocko’s response was far from a 
categorical denial.  Thus, even if Findeis had testified that 
Klocko had asked her for a favor (or asked someone else for a 
favor on her behalf), that testimony would not have directly 
contradicted Klocko.   
 Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the District 
Court’s exclusion of Yerke’s and Findeis’s testimony affected 
Morgan’s substantial rights.7
                                              
7 We note that Morgan does not make an argument with 
respect to Yeager, from whom he also sought to elicit rebuttal 
testimony at trial.  If Morgan had made such an argument, 
though, it would have failed.  Morgan proffered that Yeager 
would testify that Klocko had previously accused someone of 
“official oppression.”  This testimony would not have 
meaningfully contradicted Klocko’s testimony that he had 
previously been the “victim” of official oppression, but that 
the Board of Supervisors had been the body that made the 
formal “charge[]” arising out of that situation.  Accordingly, 
Yeager’s testimony would not have qualified as impeachment 
by contradiction. 
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D. Morgan’s Due Process Claims 
 We have reviewed Morgan’s challenges to the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment to Covington on 
Morgan’s due process claims.  We discern no error in the 
District Court’s opinion.   
 Morgan articulated two due process claims in his 
complaint.  The first was that he was deprived of his property 
interest in his job without due process of law when he was 
suspended with pay without a hearing.  The second was that 
he was deprived of his liberty interest in his reputation when 
he was publicly accused of committing the crime of official 
oppression.   
 As the District Court held, Morgan had a property 
interest in his job to which due process rights attached.  
However, we agree with it that Morgan’s interest in receiving 
a hearing before his suspension with pay was outweighed by 
Covington’s interest in maintaining the integrity of its police 
force.  This was particularly so given that Covington 
collected and reviewed witness statements and other 
documentation concerning Morgan’s performance before 
imposing the suspension.   
 Likewise, we agree with the District Court that 
Morgan’s claim based on harm to his reputation fails.  To 
succeed, Morgan would have to show that Covington 
publicized a false, stigmatizing statement about him.  Hill v. 
Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006).  
However, the District Court concluded that Morgan failed to 
show that Covington publicly accused him of official 
oppression, and our review of the record does not support a 
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different conclusion.  See Brandt v. Bd. of Co-op Educ. 
Servs., 820 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1987) (placement of letter in 
personnel file can constitute “publicity” only if the plaintiff 
can show the file is likely to be disclosed to prospective 
employers) (collecting cases).  
*    *    *    *    * 
 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the District 
Court’s entry of judgment in Morgan I, reverse its entry of 
judgment in Morgan II, and remand that case for further 
proceedings.   
